




**ACP** OBSERVATORY ON MIGRATION  
OBSERVATOIRE ACP SUR LES MIGRATIONS  
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# Migration, remittances and development in Africa: *The case of Lusophone countries*



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IOM, the IOM Development Fund and UNFPA*



## Background Note

ACPOBS/2011/BN03

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## **ACP Observatory on Migration**

The ACP Observatory on Migration is an initiative of the Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, funded by the European Union, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in a Consortium with 15 partners and with the financial support of Switzerland, IOM, the IOM Development Fund and UNFPA. Established in 2010, the ACP Observatory is an institution designed to produce data on South–South ACP migration for migrants, civil society and policymakers and enhance research capacities in ACP countries for the improvement of the situation of migrants and the strengthening of the migration–development nexus.

The Observatory was established to facilitate the creation of a network of research institutions and experts on migration research. Activities are starting in 12 pilot countries and will be progressively extended to other interested ACP countries. The 12 pilot countries are: Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

The Observatory has launched research and capacity-building activities on South–South migration and development issues. Through these activities, the ACP Observatory aims to address many issues that are becoming increasingly important for the ACP Group as part of the migration–development nexus. Documents and other research outputs and capacity-building manuals can be accessed and downloaded free of charge through the Observatory’s website ([www.acpmigration-obs.org](http://www.acpmigration-obs.org)). Other upcoming publications and information on the Observatory’s activities will be posted online.

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# **Migration, remittances and development in Africa: *The case of Lusophone countries***



Africans mostly migrate within the continent and constitute only 9 per cent of the population that migrates internationally (UNDESA, 2009). Migration in Africa, in addition to intra-regional, is unstable, largely fuelled by conflict and environmental changes, displaying high volumes of seasonal movements and growing rates of female participation. Among others, these factors contribute to the fact that **African countries receive a comparatively small amount of remittances, when compared to other benefiting areas in the developing world.**

**Remittances sent to Africa are minimal despite the fact that it is the most predictable and stable type of financial flow**

This document addresses the situation regarding international migration and financial remittances of a group of African countries united by a common language and history, although separated by many factors – **the African lusophone countries**, namely Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.<sup>1</sup> In the first section, a brief overview of current trends in African international migration and remittances will be made. In the second section, the specific case of the African lusophone countries will be singled out, featuring some development indicators, trends in international migration and remittances. Lastly, some final remarks will be set.

## 1. African Migration: Past and Current Trends

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Africa has a long tradition of migration. In the past, this was determined by the pursuit of security, search of fertile land for agriculture and, later, by the dynamics of trade between the East and West coasts through the Sahara. Later, the colonial regime has changed the motivation and composition of migration flows through the introduction and implementation of various economic and political structures, setting boundaries and imposing taxation.

**African migrants are not a homogenous group. They have different origins, motivations and destinations**

Today, **African migrants**, as the majority of migrants, **are not an easily identifiable group, with similar origins, motivations and destinations.** And as Jonsson (2009:6) puts it:

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<sup>1</sup> For information on remittances in ACP countries, their impact on development, please see [Background Note No. 2](#).

*As migration researchers are beginning to accumulate more empirical knowledge of migration on the African continent, the picture that emerges is increasingly complex. This might obscure our interpretation of historical patterns which then appear more simple and linear, in contrast to the perceived current complexity. So, the observation of growing complexity may just as well derive from the fact that we have more data now than we did in the past.*


International Migration Patterns



**Intra-regional migration.** Today, African migrants move within their country, and when they surpass their boundaries, they mainly move to neighbouring countries (Graph. 1). The Western, Southern and Northern African regions stand out for a high intensity of labour movements, triggered by attractive poles like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, South Africa and Libya. In relative terms to the native population, some small countries are mostly immigration countries, examples being the archipelagos of the Comoros and Seychelles.

**Intra-regional movement is favoured mainly by the porosity of borders, resulting in part from the large number of blocks of regional integration, which translates into many cases of temporary and irregular migration**

Graph 1: Main destinations for sub-Saharan African emigrants, 2005




Source: World Bank, 2008.

**Instability of migration.** Another feature, particularly in the region south of the Sahara, is the instability of migration flows (Graph. 2). According to a survey done by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), between 1975 and 2005 **the African region that had shown greater instability of migration was Central Africa**, with a variation of stock growth rates as: 1.6% (1975-80), -4.4% (1980-85), -0.6% (1985-90), 12% (1990-95), -12.9% (1995-2000), 2.4% (2000-2005) and 0.6% (2005-2010). Countries with greater instability were Central African Republic and Angola.

**Between 1975 and 2005 Central African Republic and Angola were the most unstable countries in terms of migration flows**

On the opposite side, **the Western African region was the least volatile in migration terms, with mostly positive growth rates.** Countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia and Burkina Faso distinguished themselves by a large immigrant population (when reported to total population).


**Graph 2: Evolution of the international migrant stock in African<sup>2</sup> sub-regions (1975-2010) (five-year, %)**



Source: Tolentino, 2009.

2 In this work, the division of Africa follows the one made by UNDESA (2009), except that we include Egypt and exclude Réunion and St. Helena islands (as they are dependencies of France and the UK, respectively).

The reasons for the **instability of flows between 1975 and 1985 are essentially political** (years of independence from European powers) **and economic** (introduction of structural adjustment programs and their social costs). The **following decades of instability are mainly explained by conflicts**.

 **Conflicts.** History has shown that conflicts do not confine to one country; replication in neighbouring countries is almost sure and fast. In Africa, examples are the civil war in Liberia (1989), which spread to Sierra Leone (1991), who later drew on in the coup and civil war in Côte d'Ivoire (1999 and 2002), which shook the stability of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso.

**Positive migration growth rates in the Western African region**, expressed in Graph. 2, mean that more immigration than emigration is taking place, which seems a paradox given the number of conflicts referred to above. But this **is explained by the fact that the population fleeing from those conflicts migrate to other countries within their own sub-region, hence explaining the high rates of immigration**. This has not occurred in the Eastern African region, where the Rwandan genocide (1994) and lasting instability in the Horn of Africa have caused people to move towards the center (hence the negative values, from 1990-95 until recent years). The instability is explained partly by the effects of the conflicts that came from East and North, that is, the conflict in Sudan and its direct influence on the stability of Chad and the Central African Republic. In the North, the rates are essentially negative, since the outflows occur mainly to nearby Europe and the conflicts in parts of Sudan (e.g. Darfur) continue.

**Positive or negative growth rates are closely correlated to the existence of conflicts. Peace, economic progress, political stability and regional integration have led to positive growth of the stock of immigrants in all African sub-regions**

**The negative growth of the stock of immigrants in Southern Africa**, between the 1980s and the new century **may be explained by the fact that apartheid extended itself until 1990**, when Namibia conquered independence, and the first free elections in South Africa only took place in 1994.

The **positive growth of the stock of immigrants** observed in almost all sub-regions in this century **will be a consequence of the prevalence of peace, some economic progress, political stability and progress within some blocks of regional integration**.



## Financial Remittances

**Remittances are the most obvious link between migration and development**, distinguishing itself from other external funding flows for its stability, predictability and for directly benefitting families. A review of the main challenges related with concepts and data collection (particularly relevant in Africa, given the relevance of the informal channels used by migrants), key trends and impacts on development and poverty reduction in Africa, was recently made by [Melde and Schicklinski, 2011](#).


🕯 **The importance of remittances. They are the largest, most stable and predictable flow of external financing in many developing economies.** As we can see in Graph. 3, remittances represent 9 to 35% of the GDP in nine ACP countries' economies, including four African ones: Lesotho, Togo, Cape Verde and Senegal. And the fact that **Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the largest unrecorded remittances inflow** (around 50% larger than the recorded inflow) still has to be considered.

**Financial remittances strongly correlate with migration and development and are the largest most predictable external financing in most developing countries**

🕯 **Financial services.** The main problems in this respect are the **lack of access to financial services, high transfer costs** (with huge differences between the North/South and the South/South corridors) and a **deficient institutional environment** in terms of regulation, competition and innovation.

🕯 **Utilization and distribution.** At the macroeconomic level, **remittances are an important source of foreign exchange and savings**. At the household level, they are mostly used in **everyday expenses, education and health**.

Graph 3: World top 25 recipients of remittances, % of GDP, 2008



Source: World Bank and Singh, 2010. Signalized African countries are ours.

## 2. The Case of African Lusophone Countries

African lusophone countries share the same colonial history

African lusophone countries are an heterogeneous group part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

The African lusophone countries are Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. These countries share a common history, which results from centuries of colonial rule from Portugal. This colonial relationship has only ceased in the mid-1970s, after a conflict (particularly in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau) that lasted until the transition of Portugal to democracy in 1974. Today, these countries form an entity designated as PALOP (“Portuguese Speaking African Countries”). They are also a prominent part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), an intergovernmental organization formed in 1996 by Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe, later joined by Timor-Leste in 2002.

## Geography, Socio-Political Environment and Development

Despite the many commonalities resulting from history, **these countries constitute a high heterogeneous group** in terms of geography, socio-political environment and development level. They are spread through Western Africa (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau), Central Africa (Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe) and Eastern Africa (Mozambique). They include two archipelagos (Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe), one medium-sized country (Guinea-Bissau) and two large countries (Angola and Mozambique). They are affiliated to five different regional blocks: Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Population dimension, GDP per capita, human development index and socio-political environment are very different (Table 1).

**Table 1: African lusophone countries: differences in geography, socio-political environment and development**

|                          | Area<br>(km <sup>2</sup> ) | Population<br>(2006) | GDP per<br>capita<br>(USD, 2007) | Human<br>Development<br>Index<br>(ranking, 2007) | Socio-political<br>environment |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| Angola                   | 1,247,000                  | 16,000,000           | 3,623                            | 143 <sup>o</sup>                                 | Mostly<br>stable               |
| Cape Verde               | 4,000                      | 518,000              | 2,705                            | 121 <sup>o</sup>                                 | Stable                         |
| Guinea-Bissau            | 36,000                     | 2,000,000            | 211                              | 173 <sup>o</sup>                                 | Unstable                       |
| Mozambique               | 8,802,000                  | 20,000,000           | 364                              | 172 <sup>o</sup>                                 | Mostly<br>stable               |
| São Tomé and<br>Príncipe | 960                        | 160,000              | 916                              | 131 <sup>o</sup>                                 | Most Mostly<br>stable          |

Source: World Bank and UNDP 2009.

## International Migration Patterns

**Past and current international migration is very different in these countries, regarding size, origin, destination** and proportion of **skilled flows** (Table 2). Despite the limitations of data accuracy and updating, some of the main characteristics are:

- 🌿 **Angola**, except for the post-independency period, is characterised by **relatively small out-migration**; today is becoming a pull region, receiving African as well as other immigrants.
- 🌿 **Cape Verde** has a long tradition of emigration, with a large diaspora mainly in Europe and the USA. It recently witnessed **increasing inflows**, from West African migrants in their way to Europe.
- 🌿 **Guinea-Bissau** displayed a strong **increase of out-migration** since the 1980s.
- 🌿 **Mozambique** has a small out-migration, mainly **linked with the Southern African migration system**.
- 🌿 **São Tomé and Príncipe's** migration flows are **large in relative terms**, although small quantitatively.

**Table 2: African lusophone countries: differences in migration patterns**

|                       | Stock of emigrants (% of population, 2005) | Top 3 Destination               | Skilled emigration (% tertiary education, 2000) | Stock of immigrants (% of population, 2005) | Top 3 Origin                     | Net international migration (2005–2010)* |
|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------|---|---|----------------------------------|--|
| Angola                | 3,3%                                       | Portugal, Zambia, Namibia       | 25,6%   | 0,4%  | --                               | 0,1%                                     |
| Cape Verde            | 35,8%                                      | Portugal, United States, France | 69,1%   | 2,2%  | STPríncipe, Angola, Portugal     | -0,5%                                    |
| Guinea-Bissau         | 7,3%                                       | Senegal, Portugal, Gambia       | 29,4%   | 1,2%  | Senegal, Guinea, Gambia          | -0,2%                                    |
| Mozambique            | 4,1%                                       | South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi  | 42,0%   | 2,1%  | South Africa, Portugal, Zimbabwe | 0,0%                                     |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 13,6%                                      | Portugal, Cape Verde, France    | 35,6%   | 4,8%  | Angola, Cape Verde, Portugal     | -0,9%                                    |

Source: World Bank and UNDP 2009.

As occurs in the broad African framework, outmigration flows have been unstable and many were related with conflict. This has particularly occurred in Angola and Mozambique, from the moment of independence to the end of their civil wars, and in Guinea-Bissau, following independence and the 1998-1999 uprising. Some of the refugee and migrant flows went to bordering countries, in line with the intra-regional African migration trends, whilst others went to Europe. In recent decades, forced and economic migrations involved different sets of individuals and groups, namely colonizers and natives, ethnic and mixed-origin groups, skilled and low-skilled workers, whose motivations, strategies and destinations varied.

**Several elements of the migration systems approach (Kritz *et al.*, 1992), which has been often applied to colonial and postcolonial settings, contribute to understand migration in lusophone countries**

Despite their specificities, it may be argued that African lusophone countries maybe integrated in a common international migration system, in this case the lusophone migratory system (Baganha, 2009). Generally speaking, **several elements of the migration systems approach** (Kritz *et al.*, 1992), **which has been often applied to colonial and postcolonial settings, contribute to understand migration in these countries**. Key factors include a set of mutual relationships (political, administrative, commercial, cultural, etc.) which facilitate and enable migration. The main geographical direction of migration flows may vary with time (a possibility allowed by the theory), thus representing a dynamic perspective of international flows.

**The Portuguese colonial history of African lusophone countries is an important component that contributes to understanding migration flows in and out those countries**

The lusophone migratory system was initially conceived to understand the Portuguese case, since many of its migratory connections, either outward or inward, involved other Portuguese-speaking countries (Baganha, 2009). According to Baganha, the system was firstly composed only of Portugal and Brazil, being subsequently enlarged to the African lusophone countries, mainly after their independence in the mid-1970s. It may now be argued that the system has acquired greater complexity with time, explaining today not only the movements from and to Portugal, but also flows involving the remaining countries.

When viewed in detail, **the largest flows of the past occurred between Portugal and Brazil** (a connection that is still well alive nowadays), given the longer period of intensive colonial relationship between them. In the African context, the first significant movements led Portuguese settlers to the colonies after the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, **followed by a sustained current from Cape Verde to Portugal** initiated in the late 1960s. The **bulk of the flows to Portugal occurred after the decolonisation in the mid-1970s**, first as a politically induced movement (its peak being the *retornados*, coming mainly from Angola and Mozambique) and then mostly as economic migration (although political motives and conflicts always kept relevance) (Baganha, 2009).

Along the time, although flows from PALOP to Portugal never ceased, they gradually become smaller. Nowadays, as a consequence of past flows, **Portugal is one of the three main destinations of every African lusophone country**, except for Mozambique, and is **one of the three main origins**, except for Guinea-Bissau (Table 2). Moreover, also Angola, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe have close migratory relationships between themselves, following connections started during the colonial period (Table 2).

As stated by the migration systems theory, **this common framework does not conceal the integration in other migration systems**. This occurs with Portugal (Baganha, 2009) and with other lusophone countries, which send and receive migrants from other parts of the world. In some cases, such as Mozambique, the links with other migration systems (in this case, the Southern African one) explain the majority of the flows.

**Angola deserves particular attention, becoming an important immigration country in the region**

The prospects for the 21<sup>st</sup> century look very different from the past. Besides the reduction of flows to Portugal, a major change is the situation in Angola. The recent economic prosperity of this country seems to have altered its migration status. Within the lusophone system, the migratory current with Portugal was reverted: whilst the flows from Angola to Portugal gradually vanished, the number of Portuguese moving to Angola has boomed in the last decade, completely altering the migratory relationship between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> Angola is also attracting an increasing number of migrants from other African countries and elsewhere.

3 See Portuguese Observatory of Emigration (<http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/home.html>). Unfortunately, no data is available on return migration of Angolan citizens.

## Remittances Flows

As a consequence of different migration patterns, also remittances vary, according to their volume, impact and countries involved (Table 3 and Graph. 4 to 6). Due to limitations in data accuracy, particularly relevant when studying remittances in the African context ([Melde and Schicklinski, 2011](#)), available figures are mainly indicative.

**Table 3: African lusophone countries: main data on remittances**

|                       | Inward flows, 2007 |                 |                | Outward flows, 2007 |                  |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                       | US million         | per capita, USD | Main origin    | US million          | per migrant, USD |
| Angola                | --                 | --              | --             | 603                 | 10,695           |
| Cape Verde            | 139                | 262             | Europe (62%)   | 6                   | 537              |
| Guinea-Bissau         | 29                 | 17              | Europe (80,5%) | 5                   | 280              |
| Mozambique            | 99                 | 5               | Europe (34%)   | 45                  | 111              |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 2                  | 13              | Europe (90,5%) | 1                   | 92               |

Source: World Bank and UNDP 2009.


Either measured in total volume or per capita, **remittances inflows, outflows and net flows differ largely**. In total volume (Graph. 4 to 6), net flows are positive and generally increasing in all countries but Angola, whilst in the latter they are becoming increasingly negative.<sup>4</sup> Considering per capita figures (Table 3), inward flows differ from 5 USD in Mozambique up to 262 USD in Cape Verde.

**Remittances outflows and inflows differ largely within African lusophone countries as a consequence of prevailing migration patterns**

<sup>4</sup> Given the lack of data from the World Bank (2010) on remittance inflows to Angola, only available for 1996 and 2008 (Graph. 4), estimates of net remittance flows in this country are only calculated for these years (Graphs. 6 and 8). It must yet be noted that estimates about remittances inflows to Angola are disputable, since the numbers provided by the World Bank are much lower than others provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (cited in Alvarez Tinajero, 2010: 78): whilst the former indicates an amount of 82 million USD, representing 0.1% of the country's GDP, in 2008, the latter points to an overall amount of 969 million USD, representing 2 per cent of the country's GDP, in 2007.


Outward flow, per migrant, differs from 92 USD in São Tomé and Príncipe up to 10,695 USD in Angola. This means that while most of the lusophone countries stand out as classic remittance receiving countries, being Cape Verde the most exemplary case, Angola’s role as a remittance sending country is increasing.

**Graph 4: Remittances outflows (US\$ millions), 1975–2009e**




Source: World Bank 2010.

**Graph 5: Remittances inflows (US\$ millions), 1975–2009**



Source: World Bank 2010.




**Graph 6: Remittances net flows (US\$ millions), 1975–2008**

Source: World Bank 2010.

With regards to the **main origin of remittances (Table 3), Europe is the most relevant one**, representing 62% for Cape Verde, 80% for Guinea-Bissau, 34% for Mozambique and 90% for São Tomé and Príncipe (World Bank and UNDP 2009). No data on origin of remittances is available for Angola. Portugal stands out as the main European country of origin of these flows, although African immigrants are far from being the main remitters from this country.<sup>5</sup> The under-representation of these immigrants' remittances in Portugal, compared to their proportion in the immigrants' stock, suggests a less intensive propensity to remit or, more probably, a limited use of formal channels, given their scarcity and cost (Tolentino *et al.*, 2008; Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). **Among the African lusophone countries, Mozambique is the one most involved in South-South migration, a large part of the remittances coming from South Africa.**

As share of GDP, remittances represent more than 9% in Cape Verde and only 0.1% in Angola (Graph 7). **Another important aspect** on the different amounts of remittances **is the different relation of each national currency** -- kwanza, Cape-Verdean escudo, franc, metical, dobra – **to the US dollar.**

<sup>5</sup> This position belongs by a large distance to Brazil, which accounts for more than half of remittances, with a much lower proportion of immigrants (about a quarter in 2010) (see Peixoto and Marques, 2006).

**Graph 7: Remittances as a share of GDP, 2008 (%)**

Source: World Bank 2010.


Research on the impacts of remittances in development is still limited. Some of the available studies are about Cape Verde (Tolentino *et al.*, 2008), Guinea-Bissau (Có, 2004; Carreiro, 2007; Quintino, 2010) and Angola (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). In the cases of Cape Verde and Angola, the major conclusions coincide with others in the African framework: remittances are one of the main transnational links between the diasporas and the home country, proceeding mainly in the families' framework; they constitute an important financial support for many families, used mostly for everyday expenses, education and health; their use in the productive framework is still limited; and the recourse to informal channels is considerable, sometimes amounting to half of the migrants. The case of Guinea-Bissau stands out for the important role of collective agents, since a large fraction of remittances is channelled by hometown associations, usually linked to specific ethnic groups, allowing a positive (although mild) impact on local development.

Generally speaking, the discussion between the mutual impacts of migration and development is still recent in most of the African lusophone countries (see Forum Gulbenkian Imigração, 2007). Among them, the situation in Cape Verde seems better, since a long tradition of transnational practices and migration-related policies, addressing diasporas and remittances, exist (see, for example, Góis, 2008).

To conclude, **the situation of Angola among the African lusophone countries deserves particular attention**, since the country is becoming a **major country of destination for immigrant workforce**, a situation that was once limited to

South Africa in the Centre and South of the continent. This new migration status is reflected in the evolution of remittances outflows and net flows in both countries (Graph. 8).

**Graph 8: Remittances outflows and net flows (US\$ millions), 1975–2008**  
**Angola and South Africa**



Source: World Bank 2010.

**Research is needed on the impact of recent economic, social and political changes in Angola, including a high economic growth rate, on migration and remittances.** Although remittances inflows have been studied (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010), not much is known about the characteristics of remittances outflows (who sends money, where and why). It has been hypothesized that **the large volume of outward remittances could partly result from the high profits from the mining industry** (Melde and Schicklinski, 2011).

**Outward remittances in Angola need to be studied further and more research is needed on recent economic, social and political changes in the country to understand their impact on migration and remittances**

Further evidence adds that another part of **the outward flows result from migration to Angola of skilled workers and professionals from European or other countries.** Data available from the Portuguese Observatory of Emigration website<sup>6</sup> indicates that, in 2009, the amount of money sent by Angolan immigrants in Portugal to their home country was 8.4 times smaller than the correspondent amount sent by Portuguese in Angola to Portugal: the first amounted to 12.3 million Euros, while the second totalled 103.5 million Euros.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/home.html>.

### 3. Final Remarks

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**Africa lives between the old and uncompromising tradition of free movement of people and the attempt to regulate and map out movements**, both out of the continent (imposed by host countries' immigration policies) and within the continent (led by national governments, in order to better understand migration and to take advantage of it for development).

In the African case, heterogeneity prevails: the international migration status of specific countries varies, as well as the motivation for flows. Remittances had up to now a limited impact on development, given its limited volume (despite a significant informal flow) and scarce use for productive purposes. However, at the micro level, they are often decisive for the well-being of many families.

In the future, when considering **South-South migration flows**, the discussion needs to focus on:

- 🌿 Concrete **efforts to improve and harmonize information systems**;
- 🌿 **Diasporas** within Africa;
- 🌿 **Coordination of migration policies** between countries and sub-regions;
- 🌿 Integration of **migration in development strategies**, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs);
- 🌿 **Coherence** between strategies, policies and action;
- 🌿 **Geographic and institutional barriers** to financial services;
- 🌿 **Improvement** of the **social, economic and political environment**.

**In the African lusophone countries, several differences on international migration and remittances trends stand out, despite the similarities with the broad African framework and the common – although partial – integration in the lusophone migration system** (Baganha, 2009).

In this respect, a major distinction must be made between:

- 🌿 **Cape Verde**, with a long tradition of emigration, as well as policy learning related with diasporas and remittances, and where immigration is starting to occur;
- 🌿 **Guinea-Bissau** and **São Tomé and Príncipe**, with a high impact of emigration;

- 🌿 **Mozambique**, the most inserted in the intra-regional African migration flows;
- 🌿 **Angola**, which may become one of the major pull regions in the continent.

In the lusophone African context, the discussion needs to focus on:

- 🌿 **Improvement and harmonization of information systems;**
- 🌿 **Specific experiences** of each of the countries concerned;
- 🌿 Possibility of **migration changes** (sending, receiving and transit contexts);
- 🌿 **Adaptation of policies** and institutions to specific needs;
- 🌿 **Coordination of migration policies**, within each sub-region, within African lusophone countries, within CPLP, and with the major origin and sending countries;
- 🌿 Integration of **migration and remittances in development strategies;**
- 🌿 **Improvement** of the **social, economic and political environment.**

#### 4. Further Reading

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